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I. Introduction
Mandatory controls on greenhouse gases were noticeably absent from the climate
change policy that President Bush announced in 2002, which instead placed heavy
reliance on private voluntaryefforts.
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Specifically, Bush directed the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a program called “Climate Leaders” to encourage
companies to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas emissions and directed the Department
of Energy (DOE) to improve the effectiveness of an already existing voluntary
greenhouse gas registry.2 Agencies implementing environmental policy have been
employing voluntary approaches such as these for over a decade, but the Bush
Administration has elevated this type of approach to a new status of importance by often
relying principally on voluntary efforts in response to significant environmental concerns.
Critics have questioned the environmental effectiveness of voluntary approaches,3 yet it
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is unclear whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides interested members
of the public the right to voice concerns and challenge agency decisions related to
voluntary approaches through rulemakings and judicial review. If the APA does not
provide public participation rights when agencies decide to use voluntary approaches,
important environmental policy decisions may be shielded from public comment and
judicial review, and a turn to widespread use of voluntary approaches may produce a
deficit of public participation in environmental policymaking.
This Paper analyzes the application of the APA to voluntary approaches in
environmental policy. In choosing a voluntary approach, agencies deliberately decide not
to issue mandatory regulations but instead to rely on voluntary participation in
furtherance of the agency’s goals, often providing various types of incentives to facilitate
the voluntary efforts. One long-standing exampleof a voluntary approach is the Energy
Star program, a voluntary labeling scheme established by the EPA in 1992 that
encourages the use of energy-efficient products.4 Although voluntary approaches have
been used for many years, until recently agencies had generally used them as
complements or precursors to mandatory regulations. In contrast, the Bush
Administration has in many circumstances promoted reliance on voluntary efforts as a
preferred alternative to mandatory regulation. The climate change policy is one example
in which the Administration has responded to environmental concerns principally by
looking towards voluntary approaches. In addition, the Department of the Interior has
often favored its “cooperative conservation” programs, in which the agency provides
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incentives for voluntary conservation efforts, over the use of regulatory controls to
achieve conservation goals.5
Voluntary approaches raise new and complex administrative law issues, which are
important to address given the rising importance of these approaches in environmental
policy. Caught between conceptions of agency action and inaction, voluntary approaches
blur the legal categories used to apply the APA’s public participation requirements.
Agencies might be viewed as taking “action” through the implementation of voluntary
approaches in that the agency identifies and acknowledges issues of concern, signals to
private actors that action is desired, provides incentives to encourage voluntary efforts,
measures progress towards objectives, and commits staff, funding, and other resources to
the endeavor. However, decisions to use voluntary approaches might alternatively be
viewed as “inaction” because they are after all a deliberate choice by an agency to refrain
from regulating. They do not create any restrictions on private action, ultimately leaving
control in the hands of private actors and taking the risk that no progress will be achieved
greater than if the agency had done nothing at all.
The application of the APA’s rulemaking and judicial review provisions to
voluntary approaches will produce different results depending upon how these
approaches are characterized. The APA requires that agencies hold rulemakings when
they create “rules” but provides certain exceptions to this requirement, notably for
“general statements of policy,” which lack binding force on the publicand the agency.6
Although voluntary approaches by definition do not bind the public, the agency could
5
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conceivably bind itself in some way through its implementation of the approach. The
presence of a binding norm, however, would seem to not be possible unless there is at
least some “action” to which the agency can be bound. Therefore, the characterization of
the agency’s decision to use a voluntary approach as action or inaction has implications
for whether the decision is classified as a policy statement under the APA, and thus for
the right to a rulemaking. In addition, the APAexpressly applies different standards for
substantive judicial depending on whether action or inaction is being challenged, and the
Supreme Court has also held that under some circumstances agency inaction is
presumptively committed to agency discretion by law.7 The legal characterization of
these approaches thus has important consequences for public participation rights under
the APA, yet so far the question seems to have escaped courts and scholarship.
The tension over the appropriate legal characterization of voluntary approaches is
further complicated by the political debate over these approaches. Agencies often
highlight voluntary programs to show the public that action is being taken in response to
environmental concerns. President Bush and agency officials such as Secretary of the
Interior Gale Norton have portrayed voluntary approaches as genuine, effective responses
to significant environmental concerns such as climate change and habitat destruction.
Such manifestations would support a conclusion that voluntary approaches should be
considered agency “action.” Conversely, environmentalists often challenge voluntary
approaches as lacking in substance and incapable of effectively addressing environmental
problems, which would suggest that that these approaches are closer to “inaction” than
action. These positions may result in paradoxes for both environmentalists wishing to
challenge the programs and agencies wishing to defend the programs. Environmental
7
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advocates will more effectively be able to argue that they are entitled to rulemakings and
judicial review under the APA by showing that agencies are taking action through
voluntary approaches, contrary to what environmentalists may claim as a substantive
matter. And agencies wishing to avoid rulemakings and receive deference in judicial
review will find it useful to take a position that, contrary to their public manifestations,
decisions to use voluntary approaches are essentially the equivalent of inaction.
Given the unresolved legal status of voluntary approaches to environmental
policy, this Paper suggests that it will often be appropriate for courts to look to the
agency’s public portrayal of the approach to determine its legal characterization for
purposes of the APA -- specifically, to determine whether the approach qualifies as action
or inaction to determine whether judicial review is available, and whether the agency has
created a binding norm to determine whether a rulemaking is required. Otherwise,
agencies may ironically escape the APAprocesses designed to make them accountable
based on a position that is contrary to the political message they send to the public. The
result would further be a shielding of important and often controversial environmental
issues from public scrutiny. The public would lose the right to participate in or challenge
the significant decisions by agencies to use voluntary approaches rather than mandatory
regulation, which will benefit the targets of regulation, who will usually prefer voluntary
policies, while disadvantaging the beneficiaries of regulation. Other important
implementation decisions as well, such as the level of environmental improvement sought
and the incentives granted to encourage voluntary efforts, will not be subject to the APA.
Even more fundamentally, a large-scale shift towards voluntary approaches would have

the potential to produce a deficit of public participation in environmental policy, with the
real losers being environmental public interest advocates.
Part II of this Paper describes the voluntary approach paradigm that is the focus of
the Paper, traces the history of the federal government’s use of voluntary programs in
environmental policy, discusses possible rationales for the use of voluntary approaches,
and explores the agency’s role in facilitating voluntary efforts. Part III discusses the
application of the APA’s rulemaking and judicial review provisions to voluntary
approaches. Part IV discusses how looking to the agency’s public portrayal of voluntary
approaches can resolve the tension over the proper legal characterization and alleviate
accountability concerns.

II. Voluntary Approaches in Federal Environmental Policy
The voluntary approaches that are the focus of this Paper have three
characteristics: 1) reliance on voluntary actions taken by private parties, rather than
actions mandated by regulation, 2) government involvement facilitating voluntary efforts,
and 3) no direct relation to existing legal requirements. The first element emphasizes that
these approaches impose no mandatory controls on private action and rely solely on
voluntary private efforts over which the agency exercises no regulatorycontrol. The
second element distinguishes these programs from the many purely private initiatives that
seek to further environmental goals through voluntary actions. Examples of such private
initiatives include the Chemical Manufacturer Association’s Responsible Care Program,
which governs the products and practices of the industry’s members, and the ISO 14000
series, a set of international environmental management standards under which

companies may voluntarily become certified.8 In contrast, the federal government
administers the programs discussed in this Paper.
Finally, the last element is meant to distinguish voluntary programs from
approaches thatrelease regulated parties from mandatory requirements in return for
compliance with alternative agreements negotiated with the government. Examples of
such “contractarian” approaches include Project XL, an experimental program launched
by the EPA under the Clinton administration that allowed regulated parties to negotiate
alternatives to pollution control requirements, and Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs)
carried out under the Endangered Species Act, which immunize landowners from
prosecution for “incidental takes” of endangered species in return for agreements to
implement conservation plans on their land.9 These types of approaches, which scholars
have referred to as “contractarian regulation”10 and “regulatory penalty default” rules,11
may seem similar to the approaches that are the focus of this Paper. Participation in both
types of approaches is voluntary, and both may seek to encourage “beyond compliance”
behavior. The crucial difference, however, is that approaches such as Project XL and
HCPs have regulatory defaults that provide the incentive for regulated parties to
participate in the program, whereas in purely voluntary programs, there is no relaxation
of mandatory standards in exchange for efforts, making participation truly “voluntary.”
8
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Drawing such a distinction is necessary because the release of parties from existing
regulatory requirements raises different legal issues than purely voluntary programs.
The voluntary approach paradigm seems yet to have been studied in depth by
scholarship, perhaps because the environmental benefits of these approaches have been
considered “marginal.”12 Other scholarly paradigms encompass some types of voluntary
approaches but do not require voluntariness as an essential characteristic.13 It has become
important, however, to examine voluntary approaches in their own right more closely,
due to their recently elevated status in federal environmental policy and the unique legal
issues they raise. This section will therefore attempt to fill in part of the gap in the
scholarship by tracing the history of the federal government’s use of voluntary
approaches in environmental policy, exploring the various rationales agencies may have
in choosing voluntary approaches, and discussing the roles of agencies in facilitating
voluntary efforts.
A. A Short History of Voluntary Approaches in Federal Environmental Policy
In 1991, the EPA for the first time experimented with a program that sought
purely voluntary efforts in furtherance of an environmental goal.14 EPA’s first voluntary
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initiative, known as the “33/50 Program,” invited selected companies to participate in the
program by pursuing emission reductions in seventeen high-priority toxic chemicals of
thirty-three percent by 1992 and fifty percent by 1995.15 Although opinions differed on
the success of the program,16 this first experimental venture has since evolved into a
diverse array of over forty voluntary programs sponsored by the EPA in which over
11,000 organizations participate.17 The DOI and DOE have also been facilitating
voluntary environmental efforts for over a decade. The DOI established its “Partners for
Fish and Wildlife” program in 1987, and this program is now one of several “cooperative
conservation” initiatives administered by the agency.18 The Energy Policy Act of 1992
required the DOE to establish a voluntary greenhouse gas registry, and the agency is
currently in the process of revising guidelines for the registry through notice-andcomment procedures as part of Bush’s climate change policy.19
The ascendancy of voluntary programs occurred as part of much larger reform
effort in environmental law. By the 1990s, many had come to agree that the “first
generation” of environmental law, which functioned mainly through a patchwork of
command-and-control statutes , suffered from significant flaws and was incapable on its
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own to carry environmental progress to the next level.20 Richard Stuart aptly summarizes
the by now familiar criticisms of command-and-control:
It has been criticized on the grounds that it is unduly rigid, cumbersome, and
costly; fails to accommodate and stimulate innovation in resource-efficient means
of pollution prevention; fails to prioritize risk management wisely; is patchwork
in character, focusing in an uncoordinated fashion on different environmental
problems in different environmental media and often ignoring functional and
ecosystem interdependencies; and relies on a remote centralized bureaucratic
apparatus that lacks adequate democratic accountability.21
Responding to the push for change, the Clinton administration initiated an effort to
“reinvent” the federal government’s environmental policy.22 This initiative resulted in
the release of a report in 1995 entitled “Reinventing Environmental Regulation” that
highlighted the need for a more collaborative approach to environmental policy. 23 EPA
proceeded to experiment with a dizzying number of “reinvention” initiatives,24 but
voluntary programs were not a main focus of these efforts. Instead, the“cornerstones” of
reinvention were the Common Sense Initiative and Project XL,25 which both operated
under the shadow of existing regulatory requirements. The innovation of these programs
was to allow for more flexible compliance by giving regulated entities the opportunity to
design alternatives to existing mandatory requirements.26
Still, new voluntary programs quietly continued to spring up, even if they were
not the main thrust of the reinvention effort. “Green Lights,” a program encouraging
20
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businesses to voluntarily install energy-efficient lighting soon followed the 30/50
program in 1991.27 In 1992, two new programs began that have enjoyed sustained
success into the present day, namely, “Energy Star” and “Design for the Environment.”28
Energy Star uses a voluntary labeling scheme to promote use of energy-efficient
products, while under Design for the Environment, partners work with the EPA to
integrate designs that reduce pollution into industry practices.29 The growth in voluntary
programs during the Clinton administration continued with the introduction of programs
such as “Waste Wise” and “Water Alliances for Voluntary Efficiency” (WAVE),
resulting in the establishment of over twenty-five EPA partnership programs by 1998.30
Voluntary approaches took on a higher profile in reinvention efforts with the
release of a new report in 1999 by a federal government task force formed to reinvigorate
the “floundering” reinvention agenda.31 The “Aiming for Excellence” report outlined an
environmental stewardship initiative calling for renewed efforts towards facilitation of
voluntary actions.32 The stewardship initiative contained two main goals – one was to
increase compliance assistance, but the primary emphasis was on the goal of encouraging
organizations to voluntarily exceed regulatory standards.33 One proposed way to promote
beyond-compliance behavior was through the use of incentives and voluntary programs;
the report highlighted the need to continue experimentation in search of effective
27
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incentives and to “improve the accessibility and increase the potential” of the EPA’s
voluntary partnership programs.34
Use of voluntary approaches has continued from the Clinton administration into
the current Bush administration, but these policy instruments seem to have been elevated
to a new status since Bush has taken office. Until the past few years, voluntary
approaches were essentially used as complements or precursors to mandatory regulations,
and as such their use was not controversial.35 Policymakers in the Bush administration,
however, instead have sometimes relied on voluntary approaches as the primary approach
for addressing environmental issues. Agency officials have promoted voluntary
approaches as solutions to particular problems, such as climate change, as well as more
universally as a generally preferable policy approach.
With the announcement of a climate change policy that rejected mandatory
controls and instead relied on voluntary effortsto curb greenhouse gas emissions , Bush
seemed to usher in a new era of unprecedented importance for voluntary programs.
Presented with a compelling environmental concern, intense controversy over whether
legal controls were necessary, and strong national and international pressures, Bush did
not respond with decisive intention either to enact mandatory regulations or refrain from
action, but instead took the position thatreliance on voluntary efforts was an appropriate
response. The EPA-sponsored program “Climate Leaders” was one specific initiative
launched by the climate change policy.36 Under this program, participating companies
34
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agree to complete a company-wide inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, report
inventory data annually, and enter into discussions with the EPA to develop an
“aggressive” emissions reduction goal to be achieved over five to ten years.37 Another
initiative involved enhancing the voluntary greenhouse gas registry already established
under 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act, which had seen limited participation.38 DOE
published proposed revised guidelines for the voluntary registry in the Federal Register
on December 5, 2003 and is currently soliciting public comment as of this writing.39
Beyond the specific context of climate change as well, the words and actions of
high-ranking officials in the Bush administration have brought voluntary approaches to
the forefront of environmental policy. Under what President Bush and Secretary of the
Interior Gale Norton call the “new environmentalism,” the favored approach is
encouraging local cooperation in voluntary conservation efforts through the use of
incentives, rather than governing through mandatory regulations.40 For example,
Secretary Norton has promoted the benefits of restoring wetlands through “cooperative
conservation efforts, partnerships, and voluntary programs” in which the federal
government provides funds and technical assistance to private parties to rehabilitate
wetlands, as opposed to protection through traditional regulation of wetlands under the
Clean Water Act.41 Similarly, the EPA has sought to replace previously mandatory
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controls with reliance on voluntary efforts,42 and recently appointed EPA Administrator
Michael Leavitt has proclaimed collaboration with private interests to be his preferred
approach.43
B. Rationales of Voluntary Approaches
1. Environmental Goals
Agencies may rely on private voluntary efforts to pursue a variety of
environmental goals. Voluntary efforts may produce direct environmental benefits, such
as pollution reduction or habitat restoration. Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, for
instance, is a direct environmental benefit that the EPA encourages through the Climate
Leaders program. As of April 2004, 54 companies have joined the program, including
General Motors, Gap Inc., and IBM, and some have set reduction goals.44 The DOI’s
cooperative conservation projects also seek to achieve direct environmental benefits by
providing incentives for voluntary conservation efforts on private lands through costshare grants.45 DOI administers the funds through a number of programs, ranging from
newer initiatives such as the Landowner Incentive Program46 and the Private Stewardship
Grants Program47 to more established programs such as “Partners for Fish and Wildlife,”
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which since 1987 has been offering technical and financial assistance to private
landowners to voluntarily restore fish and wildlife habitats on their land.48
Agencies may also aim through voluntary approaches to heighten environmental
consciousness in business practices and consumer purchases. Under the Energy Star
program, the EPA and DOE accomplish this goal by increasing awareness of energy
efficiency among industries and consumers.49 Since the beginning of the program in
1992, the agencies have established standards for displaying the Energy Star label for 35
product categories.50 Private actors may participate in Energy Star through
manufacturing, marketing, or selling products with the Energy Star label and by
promoting energy efficiency through other efforts.51 The EPA claims that in 2002,
Energy Star prevented greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to those from 14 million
vehicles.52
For almost all environmental issues, uncertainty exists regarding the extent of the
risk and the most effective approach for responding to the concern. Agencies may use
voluntary approaches to collect information and experiment with new approaches in
order to produce more informed and innovative environmental policy solutions. Under
voluntary partnerships, agencies and private entities can collaborate to perform research,
experiment with new approaches, or share information on best environmental practices.
In EPA’s “Design for the Environment” program, for example, the agency collaborates
with private industries to design products, production processes and technologies that will
48
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reduce pollution and waste fewer resources.53 To accomplish their goals, Design for the
Environment partnerships identify pollution prevention opportunities, evaluatethe costs
and benefits of these alternative approaches, disseminate the information produced to the
entire industry, and encourage the use of this information to further environmental
improvement.54
2. Theoretical Models
Agencies may also turn to voluntary approaches based on particular theories of
how environmental policy goals are best achieved. The search for “next generation”
environmental solutions has given rise to a prolific amount of scholarship proposing
alternatives to the conventional command-and-control structure.55 Although there seem
to be no suggested theoretical models that require the exclusive use of voluntary
approaches or look upon them as sufficient on their own to sustain environmental
progress, some models may still provide theoretical justifications for the use of voluntary
approaches.
Underlying many of the “next generation” approaches to environmental policy is
an emphasis on collaboration between the government and various stakeholders.56
Environmental policymaking generally takes place in a highly adversarial atmosphere,
perhaps even “the most combative regulatory arena in American politics.”57 While
raising complicated accountability issues, collaborative approaches may produce benefits
by harnessing expertise outside of the government and instilling a greater ethic of private
53
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responsibility for environmental protection than could be achieved through merely
requiring regulated entities to follow mandates which they had no role in creating.58
Under the model of “collaborative governance,” interested and affected parties work
together in developing solutions, with the agency serving to facilitate collaboration
among stakeholders by providing incentives for participation and information sharing,
technical resources, and funding.59 The outcomes reached through collaborative
negotiations are not necessarily voluntary for compliance purposes, but the notion of
collaboration is often a strong force driving voluntary programs. The EPA has noted that
“enforcement actions…by their very nature often result in adversarial relationships with
limited trust,” while “[i]n a non-regulatory program, the regulatory agency and regulated
community typically work more closely together to achieve a common goal.”60 Secretary
Norton has been a strong proponent of collaborative approaches, promoting what she
refers to as the “four C’s” – “communication, consultation, and cooperation, all in the
service of conservation.”61
The “reflexive law” model provides another possible rationale for the use of
voluntary approaches. Under reflexive law theory, the purpose of the law is to encourage
organizations to internalize environmental norms rather than to directly control their
external actions.62 Rather than issuing mandatory regulations, therefore, a reflexive law
approach views organizations as essentially self-regulating and focuses instead on ways
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for the government to provide incentives and support for the internalization of norms.63
Exchange of information is essential under reflexive law, because knowledge of actions
and their consequences leads to dialogue among stakeholders that furthers the
internalization of environmental norms.64 Thus, one significant contribution the
government can make is to ensure that the relevant information is generated and
exchanged among stakeholders.65 Voluntary programs can promote reflexive law’s aims
by encouraging companies to consider the environmental impact of their actions and
share information about their environmental performance with the government and the
public.66 For example, reporting schemes such as the voluntary registry for greenhouse
gas emissions established pursuant to 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act can serve
reflexive law purposes because the release of such information encourages dialogue
between the companies and larger society over the optimal level of environmental
performance. Environmental labeling schemes such as Energy Star are another type of
voluntary reflexive law strategy.67 One important caveat, however, is that even
supporters of reflexive law do not view it as a complete substitute for command-andcontrol but rather as an important complementary approach.68
Voluntary programs may also respond to the criticisms that have been weighed
against the predominant command-and-control structure of environmental policy. They
may mitigate problems stemming from the uncertainty inherent in environmental
problems and the inefficiencies associated with command-and-control by allowing more
63

See Stewart, supra note 20, at 127-28.
Id. at 131.
65
Id.
66
See Orts, supra note 3, at 1284-86 (“Voluntary programs are in some important ways reflexive” although
they “do not go far enough.”).
67
Id. at 1271-72.
68
Stewart, supra note 20, at 133-34; Orts, supra note 3, at 1234.
64

flexibility than would be possible under pure command-and-control regulation.
Continuous adaptation in environmental policy is necessary due to the uncertainties
involved, yet one of the prime complaints that has emerged from “next generation”
scholarship is that the current command-and-control structure chills innovation.69
Voluntary approaches may respond to uncertainty by keeping efforts flexible and open to
experimentation in the face of scientific, technological, and regulatory uncertainties, with
the possibility of moving towards mandatory controls in the future. Consistent with this
purpose, voluntary programs have often been used as “pilots” to forward the development
of more permanent policies.70 Another frequent criticism of command-and-control is that
by mandating in detailed manner the steps regulated parties must take to satisfy
environmental law requirements, command-and-control regulations force parties to
comply with standards in ways that might not be cost-efficient and may preclude the
possibility of less costly compliance that accomplishes the same or even superior
environmental performance.71 Voluntary approaches may serve to address such
concerns; with no legal requirements in place, the parties will obviously have unlimited
flexibility in meeting the desired goals. Choosing a voluntary approach based solely on
promoting compliance flexibility is of questionable logic, however, since the flexibility
concern could also be addressed simply by setting mandatory environmental standards
and allowing regulated entities as much flexibility as appropriate in meeting those goals.
This was in fact the theory behind Project XL and other “contractarian” approaches that
provided regulated parties additional flexibility in meeting requirements.
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3. Legal and Political Constraints
In pursuing voluntary approaches, agencies may also be responding to legal or
political constraints on their authority to issue mandatory regulations. Congress may not
have granted legal authority to the agency to issue mandatory regulations, or legal
authority may be controversial. For example, the EPA currently takes the position the
Clean Air Act (CAA) does not give it authority to regulate greenhouse gases.72 At the
same time that the EPA denied a petition for a rulemaking to introduce mandatory
controls, however, it emphasized its separate authority to pursue non-binding approaches:
Lack of CAA authority to impose GHG control requirements does not leave the
Federal Government powerless to take sensible measured steps to address the
global climate change issue….The CAA and other statutes…authorize, and EPA
and other agencies have established, nonregulatory programs that provide
effective and appropriate means of addressing global climate change while
scientific uncertainties are addressed.73
As another example, the DOI would not have the authority under the Endangered Species
Act to mandate many of the conservation plans on private lands it achieves through
collaboration with landowners.74
When legal authority does exist, agencies may still face political constraints and
pursue voluntary efforts out of a reluctance to impose the economic cost of mandatory
regulations. There may be a judgment that new regulations or increasing standards in
response to a particular problem would not be desirable or efficient. Perhaps the risk is
small, thought to be predominantly managed by existing regulation or considered too
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costly to regulate in a uniform and binding manner.75 Certain entities may be positioned
to make improvements at relatively little cost, while imposing new obligations on entire
industries would come at a large price. In those types of circumstances, it may make
policy sense for the agency to avoid mandatory controls but use voluntary programs to
provide incentives encouraging companies that can meet heightened standards relatively
easily to do so,.
C. Agency Roles in Facilitating Voluntary Efforts
One might ask what the purpose of agency involvement is in voluntary
approaches, since private parties are obviously free to take positive environmental actions
even without official government encouragement. .If the role of agencies is considered
insignificant, voluntary approaches might well be characterized as inaction for legal
purposes. An understanding of the roles agencies play in facilitating voluntary efforts
therefore is important in considering the legal status of voluntary approaches.
Priority setting is one role agencies serve in voluntary approaches. At the outset
in establishing voluntary programs, the agency identifies an area in which voluntary
actions would be beneficial. Agencies are in a better position than private companies to
determine environmental priorities because they have the expertise to know what
environmental needs exist that are not currently addressed by mandatory regulations and
to set voluntary standards at appropriate levels. In addition, agencies are more likely to
center voluntary initiatives around issues that are of concern to the public; even if
agencies do not hold rulemakings to solicit public comment on their decisions to use
voluntary approaches, they are still indirectly accountable through the President and
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Congress. In contrast, when corporations make environmental efforts without
government involvement, they are more likely to respond to market pressures without
systematically evaluating the greatest environmental needs. Corporations can certainly
make positive environmental contributions by setting goals independent of government
recommendations, but agencies are in a better position to determine priorities for
widespread voluntary initiatives.
After the program is established, the agency continues to contribute through its
role as a central figure. Many voluntary programs require more than just isolated
voluntary efforts to be workable; there are often important organizational and
coordinating functions that the agency must undertake. As central figures, agencies may
perform various tasks such as collecting information, developing guidelines and
standards, measuring performance, tracking progress towards goals, and modifying
approaches when necessary. These types of agency actions will be especially important
in collaborative efforts such as Design for the Environment and in programs that require
coordinating the efforts of a large number of participants, such as the 1605(b) greenhouse
gas registry.
The devotion of resources by agencies is also important. The tasks that agencies
perform to encourage voluntary efforts require a substantial investment of time, staff and
funding. Environmental non-profits usually do not have the resources to devote to such
comprehensive efforts, and private companies will often not consider the investment to
unilaterally develop new environmental approaches worth the cost. Agencies thus can
serve an important function by devoting the resources necessary to create “ready-made”
voluntary approaches for companies to follow and by continuing to measure results and

modify approaches when appropriate. Such an allocation of resources will encourage
private entities to engage in voluntary efforts by making such efforts less costly. In
addition to providing resources for the development of approaches, agencies may also
sometimes directly fund the environmental improvements, as in the DOI’s cooperative
conservation programs. In 2003, DOI awarded $12.9 million in grants to fund projects
ranging from invasive species eradication to habitat restoration, involving 749
“partners.”76
The risk of voluntary approaches is obviously that private parties may not
“volunteer” to the necessary extent.77 Importantly then, agencies also provide incentives
for participation in voluntary programs. In promoting its voluntary partnership programs,
the EPA appeals to the direct benefits companies can receive from participation – mainly
cost savings, public recognition and technical assistance.78 Public recognition is an
important incentive that agencies have a large role in facilitating. Agencies may simply
recognize companies as program participants, or may establish minimum of criteria for
recognition. For companies wishing to gain a more advantageous market position as a
result of their environmental efforts, agencies can establish consistent criteria for making
comparisons among companies, measure the performance of participants to ensure their
adherence to standards, and provide the credibility to substantiate environmental claims
76
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by companies of which consumers might otherwise be skeptical.. Agencies also provide
avenues for sharing the achievements of program participants with the public. When the
recognition relates to specific products, as in Energy Star, the endorsement can come in
the form of a label displayed on the product, or when the goal is to recognize the
company as a whole, the recognition may come through press releases and posting of
information on agency web sites, among other possible methods.79 Another incentive
that agencies commonly provide through voluntary programs is technical assistance.
Environmental improvements, such as waste reduction, water conservation, or increased
energy efficiency, may result in cost savings to companies.80 Through their expertise,
agencies can assist companies in achieving their environmental goals.81 Technical
assistance may range from providing information on waste reduction techniques to
developing a methodology for recording greenhouse gas emissions.82

III. Application of the APA to Voluntary Approaches
A. Application of the APA’s Rulemaking Requirements
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When issuing rules, agencies must conduct a “rule making” in accordance with
Section 553 of the APA.83 Specifically, agencies must publish notice of the proposed
rulemaking, provide opportunity for interested parties to participate in the rulemaking
through submission of written comments, and incorporate a statement of basis and
purpose in the rules adopted.84 These requirements are jointly known as “notice-andcomment” procedures. A rule promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures is
considered a “legislative” rule and is given the same force of law as statutes.85 A
strikingly large proportion of agency rules, however, escape APA rulemaking
requirements; rulemaking in fact is “in relative terms a rare occurrence” compared with
the volume of agency rules not issued through notice-and-comment.86 To illustrate,
according to one anecdote the Federal Aviation Administration rules issuedthrough
rulemakings occupied about two inches of shelf space, while the corresponding guidance
materials not produced through rulemakings took up over forty feet, and such a ratio is
typical.87 This reality exists because the APA provides a fair number of exceptions that
exempt rules from the rulemaking requirements.
1. Requirement of a “Rule”
A rulemaking can be required in the first place only if the agency reaches some
decision that rises to the level of a “rule.”88 The APA definition of a “rule” includes “the
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whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”89 Courts have generally
construed this definition broadly “to include nearly every statement an agency may
make.”90 The rule definition encompasses even seemingly informal agency products,
such as staff instructions, manuals, question-and-answer bulletins, and press releases.91
The broad scope of the “rule” definition has at times been controversial, however,
with suggestions that at least a certain level of formality is required for an agency
statement to qualify as a rule. In a recent concurring opinion in a D.C. Circuit case,
Judge Silberman questioned the usual breadth accorded to the definition.92 He quoted a
statement by then-Professor Scalia opining that the lack of any meaningful limiting factor
in the rule definition is “absurd” and that therefore “the only responsible judicial attitude
toward this central APA definition is one of benign disregard.”93 Silberman’s own
opinion was that “[n]ot every utterance, not every speech” by an agency “legitimately can
be described as a rule,” and “Congress surely meant that an agency statement that serves
the purpose of a rule is a rule….But any agency statement which does not authoritatively
seek to answer an underlying policy or legal issue does not fit that criteria.”94 As a
practical matter, however, not much turns on the designation of rules since courts instead
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tend to focus on whether one of the express APA exceptions apply and often ignore the
rule issue altogether.95
Despite the lack of guidance from courts, it seems fairly certain that agency
decisions to pursue voluntary approaches qualify as rules. Both decisions to take action
and refrain from taking action can fall within the rule definition provided that they rise to
at least a minimal level of formality in the way they are communicated, so decisions to
implement voluntary approaches may be considered rules whether or not as a substantive
matter they are considered action. In establishing voluntary approaches, the agency still
makes a deliberate decision to “implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” in a
certain manner; a choice of a voluntary approach reflects thatthe agency has made a
choice at least for the present time among the different policy options, ranging from
regulation to inaction, for addressing a particular issue.
2. Exceptions to Rulemaking Requirements
When an agency creates a rule, the APA still provides a range of exceptions that
may exempt the rule from rulemaking requirements. The exceptions fall into three broad
categories: exceptions based on the subject matter of the rule, exceptions based on the
form of the rule, and a flexible “good cause” exception. The subject matter exceptions
exempt rules that involve military or foreign affairs, agency management or personnel,
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.96 The exceptions based on the form
of the rule apply to “interpretive rules,” “rules of agency organization, procedure, or
95
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practice,” and importantly for purposes of this paper, “general statements of policy.”97
Finally, the “good cause” exception allows agencies to exempt rules when “the agency
for good cause finds…that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”98
“General statements of policy” are probably the most important exception for the
purpose of analyzing voluntary approaches. This exception is not defined by the APA,
but courts have developed a doctrine that focuses on the presence of a binding norm to
determine whether statements fall under the policy statement exception. One leading
case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, described policy
statements in this way:
A general statement of policy…does not establish a “binding norm.” It is not
finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed….A policy
statement announces the agency’s tentative intentions for the future. When the
agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support
the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.99
Commentators have described the doctrine that has developed surrounding the policy
statement exception as “tenuous,” “fuzzy,” “blurred,” “baffling,” and “enshrouded in
considerable smog,” but some general observations still seem possible.100 Importantly
for the purpose of analyzing voluntary programs, courts have held that the “binding
norm” may apply not only to the public but also to the agency itself.101 In determining
whether the policy statement contains a norm that binds the agency or the public, courts
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have looked to both the intent of the agency as expressed in the statement, as well as to
any practical binding effect the agency gives the statement.102
Given that the lack of a binding norm is the essential characteristic of a policy
statement, voluntary approaches might at first glance seem by their very definition to be
policy statements, but a closer analysis showsthat the question is uncertain. Clearly,
voluntary approaches by definition do not contain norms that bind the public, but if
agencies are found to bind themselves through voluntary approaches, they will not
qualify for the policy statement exception. The most commonly followed test for
determining whether an agency statement contains a binding norm seems to come from
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Bus Association v. United States which set out
two criteria: 1) whether a statement acts prospectively, and 2) “whether a purported
statement genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise
discretion.”103 However, this test will not even have relevance if the agency is viewed as
not taking any action at all through voluntary approaches. Then the statement could have
neither present nor prospective effect, and there could be no binding of the agency’s
discretion because the agency would not be taking any action. If the agency is seen as
taking no action, then there is nothing to which the agency can be bound, and the policy
statement exception applies due to the lack of a binding norm. But if the agency is seen
as taking action, then it becomes possible that the agency may bind itself in how it carries
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out that action, such that a binding norm will exist and the policy statement exception
will not apply.
There are different types of agency decisions related to voluntary approaches that
might be considered action, including the initial choice to encourage voluntary efforts in
furtherance of a particular environmental policy objective, the formulation of specific
approaches for facilitating voluntary efforts, and the granting of incentives to
participants. If the choice to pursue a voluntary approach is viewed as action, it could
conceivably have a binding effect upon the agency. When agencies announce to the
public that they will pursue voluntary approaches, they apparently commit themselves at
least for an indefinite period to the use of that policy approach in furtherance of the
environmental objective and to taking the actions necessary to implement the approach,
such as allocating resources to the program and providing incentives. If the program is
intended to be immediately established, there is a prospective effect, and the agency’s
discretion is also bound at least in a practical sense by its commitment to administer the
program.
Decisions made by agencies in the course of implementing voluntary approaches
may also have a prospective effect and bind the agency’s discretion. For example, the
rulemaking currently underway to amend the DOE’s voluntary registry would meet these
criteria, since once completed, the agency will follow those guidelines and apply them
consistently to entities reporting emissions. The administration of incentives by agencies
may also have the effect of binding the agency, depending on how concrete the benefits
are and how consistently the agency applies them. For example, one could imagine that
if a company’s product meets the Energy Star standards, yet the agency denies a label,

the company might argue that the agency is bound by its standards. A prospective effect
and a binding of the agency discretion with respect to incentives will sometimes be
necessary again to attract participants, since they will want to be assured of the benefits
they will receive in return for voluntary efforts. Consistency will also sometimes be
necessary to achieve the environmental objectives of the program. For example, in order
for the Energy Star label to have meaning to consumers, agencies must adhere to
consistent standards in allowing the label to be displayed. Other times, however,
voluntary programs may provide benefits that do not carry such specific expectations in
their application, such as public recognition through press releases or opportunities for
cooperative efforts, that would not translate easily into policies that bind the agency.
Further insight on the application of the policy statement exception to voluntary
approaches may come from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lincoln v. Vigil, which
found an agency’s decision to be subject to the policy statement exception in
circumstances similar to those that that occur when voluntary programs are established.104
This case concerned review of a decision by the Indian Health Service to terminate a
program that provided services to handicapped Indian children in the Southwest in order
to reallocate resources to a national program.105 The Court unanimously found that the
agency’s decision to terminate the program was “surely” a “general statement of policy”
and therefore not subject to notice-and-comment requirements.106 The court
characterized the action as an “announcement…that an agency will discontinue a
discretionary allocation of unrestricted funds from a lump-sum appropriation” and cited a
previous case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, for the proposition that
104
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“decisions to expend otherwise unrestricted funds are not, without more, subject to the
notice-and-comment requirements of § 553.”107 The factual setting of the case is similar
to that which occurs when agencies establish voluntary programs-- as in Lincoln v. Vigil
the agency makes a decision to use its resources for a program that will promote
particular objectives in a manner that does not impose obligations on regulated parties.
Although the court focused on the allocation of resources as the significant aspect of the
agency’s action, the agency’s decision contained real substantive content in that
significant benefits to Indian children were withdrawn and redistributed. The benefits
administered through the program terminated had a much more direct and substantive
impact on certain parties than do the incentives of most voluntary programs, which might
suggest that voluntary approaches are even stronger candidates for the policy statement
exception. However, important differences also exist between the decision to reallocate
funds in this case and decisions to establish voluntary approaches. In Lincoln v. Vigil, the
agency was not changing its commitment towards a particular policy objective (helping
handicapped Indian children) or the essential manner in which it furthered that objective
(providing direct services to children); the agency only decided to change the scope of the
action. Therefore, an agency’s decision to pursue a particular environmental policy
objective and its choice of approach for pursuing the objective might be considered to
establish a new binding norm, unlike the agency action in Lincoln v. Vigil.
In addition to the policy statement exception, the subject matter exceptions under
the APA that exempt agencies from rulemakings may also have relevance to voluntary
approaches. The “grants” and “benefits” exceptions have the potential to apply the most
frequently. For example, the DOI’s conservation initiatives provide grants to fund
107
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voluntary efforts. These programs would seem to straightforwardly qualify for the grants
exception. Analysis of the benefits exception, however, may prove more complicated.
The non-grant incentives that agencies give to facilitate voluntary efforts might seem to
qualify as “benefits.” But benefits that have been traditionally encompassed by the
exception seem to comprise mostly of monetary payments provided to persons based on
their personal status, such as government employment benefits and Social Security
benefits, rather than the types of incentives employed by voluntary programs.108 There
would also be a question of how tangible the benefit must be in order to qualify for the
exception. Even if the right to display an Energy Star label is considered a benefit, what
about unspecified assurances of public recognition of greenhouse gas reductions?
Furthermore, the benefits and grants exception has been justified on the ground that, “[i]f
the government wishes to impose restrictions, the recipients can avoid restrictions by not
accepting the grant or benefit; and if the government wishes to terminate the grant or
benefit, the recipient had no right to it and thus is not entitled to a voice in whether it is
terminated.”109 If this is therationale behind the exception, exempting benefits programs
because the public has no “right” to the benefit would seem unpersuasive in the context
of voluntary approaches where achieving environmental goals, rather than providing
benefits to participants, is the primary purpose of the program. The effect of applying the
exception in such circumstances would be to deny the public participation in decisions on
how to address environmental policy concerns because the approach incidentally
included incentives that rose to the level of “benefits.”
3. Agency Practice
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It is worth asking how agencies themselves view their obligations to hold
rulemakings for voluntary approaches. Agency statements frequently reflect an
assumption that rulemakings are not necessary for “voluntary” or “non-regulatory”
approaches to implement policy. For example, a recent Federal Register notice stated,
“we are considering best how to accomplish this through actions that do not involve
rulemaking or other regulatory methods,” and a list of example “non-regulatory”
programs followed that included such programs as Energy Star and Project XL (which is
not even a purely voluntary program as defined by this Paper).110 Another recent
statement in the Federal Register announced, “Instead of a rulemaking, the Coast Guard
will proceed with establishing this voluntary experimental approval program using a
Coast Guard circular,” while another queried, “Should the Agency initiate rulemaking to
adopt the guidelines as regulations or will the guidelines be sufficiently effective if they
are only voluntary?”111 These statements came from such diverse agencies as the EPA,
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Agriculture.
Rulemakings to implement voluntary approaches do still occur. One noteworthy
example is the rulemaking currently being held by the Department of Energy to revise the
voluntary greenhouse gas reporting system under Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy
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Act, as directed by President Bush’s climate change policy.112 A reasonable inference is
perhaps that agencies are more likely to hold rulemakings when they are implementing
specific statutory mandates, such as in 1605(b), as opposed to when they are creating
voluntary programs pursuant to broad statutory authority. For example, in contrast to
1605(b)’s specific mandate, Section 103 of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to
“develop, evaluate, and demonstrate non regulatory strategies and technologies for air
pollution prevention.”113 These two statutes also provide arguably different public
participation requirements: 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act requires “opportunity for
public comment,” while Section 103 of the Clean Air Act instead requires “opportunities
for participation by industry, public interest groups, scientists, and other interested
persons.”114
Rulemakings, of course, are not the entire universe of ways in which agencies can
facilitate public participation. There are many other methods agencies can use that are
less formal than the notice-and-comment process. Both the EPA and DOI have policies
that encourage agency decision makers to provide meaningful public participation
opportunities above and beyond statutory requirements.115 Actions serving those
purposes may take a variety of forms, including press releases, mailings, public meetings,
hearings, workshops, and informal communications.116 The informal public
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participation actions may serve a variety of purposes, ranging from one-way sharing of
information by the agency to the solicitation and incorporation of public opinion into the
decision-making process. Therefore, the public may still be involved in the
implementation of voluntary programs even when no rulemaking takes place. For
example, the Climate Leaders program has issued press releases, made its Draft Protocols
available for public comment, and held meetings with corporations who have signed on
as partners.117 When the APA requirements do not apply, however, the level of public
participation that occurs is subject to the complete discretion of the agency.118 Agency
decision makers may choose whether public participation is desirable or feasible at all
considering the nature of the action and budget and time constraints, and if so, which
actions or decisions to open to the public, what level of participation to allow, and which
parties to allow to participate.
B. Application of Substantive Judicial Review Requirements
In addition to participation in the creation of policy through rulemakings,
members of the public may also seek to influence agency decision making through
substantive judicial review pursuant to Section 702 of the APA. Parties might challenge
agency decisions related to voluntary approaches for a variety of reasons. They might
disagree with the choice to refrain from issuing mandatory regulations or take issue with
a decision made in the course of implementing the program, such as the goals or
standards established. Program participants might seek to challenge the agency’s
decision not to award benefits thought to be due in return for voluntary efforts. A
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competitor of companies participating in the program might seek to invalidate the entire
program in order to prevent the participating companies from gaining a market edge as a
result of agency recognition.
The characterization of voluntary approaches as “action” or “inaction” has
important implications for the availability of substantive judicial review. If the decision
to use a voluntary approach is viewed as inaction, then the availability of substantive
judicial review under the APA is limited to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed.”119 A court would therefore only be able to provide a remedy
when the agency’s failure to issue a mandatory rule directly violates a statutory directive,
so judicial review will rarely be available. If the entire program is considered inaction,
other decisions made in the course of implementing the program will also be sheltered
from judicial review. In contrast, if there is found to be agency “action,” then courts have
broader authority to review for agency decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”120
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that at least one type of agency
inaction is committed to agency discretion by law. The Court established a presumption
in Heckler v. Chaney that decisions not to take enforcement action are immune from
judicial review under Section 701(a)(2) of the APA.121 The concurrence to the case also
established several caveats to the presumption against reviewability, observing that the
Court did not hold that review was not available in cases where, rather than declining to
enforce in a single case, an agency claims it has no statutory jurisdiction to enforce,
“engages in a pattern of nonenforcement of clear statutory language,” or refuses to
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enforce a regulation in effect.122 However, the issue of agency enforcement analyzed in
Chaney is different from the type of inaction involved in decisions to use voluntary
approaches, since the very decision not to enforce requires that there must have already
been some mandatory controls in place. Non-enforcement may be a practical issue when
the complaint is that the agency has relied on voluntary approaches rather than enforcing
mandatory laws and regulations already created,123 but plaintiffs will not be able to
directly challenge an agency’s pattern of non-enforcement by challenging the agency’s
choice to use a voluntary approach.
Instead, the type of “inaction” likely to be at issue in review of voluntary
approaches is the failure of the agency to issue mandatory regulations. Parties who are
dissatisfied with agency reliance on voluntary efforts could petition the agency to hold a
rulemaking to consider the need for mandatory regulations under Section 553(e) of the
APA which provides that “[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”124 The right to petition is
available without regard to the nature of the action being sought or actions that the
agency has already taken, but the APA provides the right only to petition the agency and
does not require that agencies carry out the petition’s request or even respond to the
petition. Petitioners may seek judicial review of agency denials of petitions for
rulemaking, but courts have extended a great deal of deference to agencies in such cases.
D.C. Circuit opinions have observed the “extremely limited, highly deferential scope” of
review of agency refusals to hold rulemakings, a deference that is so broad as to “make
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the process akin to non-reviewability.”125 Such deference stems from a policy that
agencies rather than courts are best suited to determine how to allocate their limited
resources in furtherance of their mission. The D.C. Circuit has held that Chaney
presumption against review of agency inaction does not extend to review of agency
refusals to hold rulemakings, although it observed that Chaney reinforced the highly
deferential standard applied in reviewing agency decisions to not hold rulemakings.126
Even if an agency decision to rely on voluntary efforts is conceived of as
“action,” the unique characteristics of these approaches will still present further hurdles
to parties seeking judicial review. The APA makes reviewable only “final” agency action
and not “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate” action.127 Whether the finality
requirement is satisfied will depend on which “action” the court looks to in making its
determination. If the action is considered to be the agency’s initial decision to establish a
voluntary program, the finality requirement will probably be satisfied, since there will be
no further steps necessary to complete that decision. Decisions rendered by an agency
respecting the administration of incentives in individual cases also would also likely be
considered final after the benefit is granted or once the agency indicates that the decision
not to grant a benefit is no longer open for discussion. However, those challenging
general aspects of the approach might find it more difficult to satisfy the finality
requirement. Given the experimental purpose of many voluntary approaches, they will
be constantly adapting and changing, and it therefore might not easily follow thatan
agency’s precise original conception of the approach would be considered “final.” In
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addition, if the agency action is viewed as a decision to pursue a voluntary rather than a
mandatory approach, this decision may be difficult to characterize as “final” since the
agency can claim that it is still keeping an open mind to mandatory regulation and the
decision to pursue a voluntary approach will have no bearing on that decision.
Courts may also find that decisions establishing voluntary approaches are
“committed to agency discretion by law” under the meaning of Section 701(a)(2). The
Court held in Chaney held that enforcement decisions generally fall into this category of
immunity, but other types of agency decisions may also be sheltered from judicial
review. Specifically, decisions allocating funds from lump-sum appropriations are
another category that courts have traditionally considered as committed to agency
discretion that may have implications for voluntary approaches. This was the basis for
the court’s conclusion in Lincoln v. Vigil that the agency’s decision to terminate funding
for a regional program in favor of a national one was committed to the agency’s
discretion, since such decisions are viewed as “peculiarly” within the agency’s
expertise.128 The commitment of budgetary decisions to agency discretion may have
implications for the establishment of voluntary programs, because one of most important
choices an agency make is the devotion of resources to facilitating the voluntary efforts.
However, as discussed above with respect to Lincoln v. Vigil, the agency is making other
important decisions in addition to budgetary allocation, such as the decisions to pursue a
particular environmental policy objective and to use a voluntary approach for that
purpose, so the designation of resources alone probably should not cause the agency’s
decision to be unreviewable.
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Standing requirements under the APA may also be a significant obstacle. The
Supreme Court has held that the minimum constitutional requirements of standing consist
of three elements: the plaintiff must show a particularized “injury in fact,” a “causal
connection” between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and the redressability of the
injury by a favorable court decision.129 These requirements may cause difficulty for
plaintiffs challenging voluntary approaches, especially for environmental plaintiffs. The
Supreme Court has strictly interpreted the particularized injury requirement in
environmental cases, holding, for example, that a plaintiff did not suffer a particularized
injury from agency action impacting an area that the plaintiff had visited and planned to
return to at some unspecified time.130 The injury and causal connection to the agency’s
conduct will be even more difficult to show in challenges by environmental plaintiffs to
voluntary approaches. First, plaintiffs will likely need to show thatthey are being
personally injured by the environmental harm that the voluntary approach seeks to
address. But voluntary environmental efforts will not themselves injure anyone, so
plaintiffs would further have to show that they would have been better off had the agency
adopted some different approach. The redressability requirement will also create
complications because it is not clear what remedy the court could provide that would
directly address the proffered injury -- simply invalidating the voluntary program would
not address the injury, but the court will probably not go as far as to tell the agency which
approach to adopt. Participants in voluntary programs who seek to challenge not the
agency’s policy decision but rather individualized decisions regarding the conferral of
incentives will likely find it easier than environmental plaintiffs to satisfy standing
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requirements. If the agency denies a benefit to a program participant, for example, the
injury involved to the plaintiff is more direct and can be easily redressed by a court
ordering the agency to confer the benefit.

IV. Resolving the Paradox: Ensuring Appropriate Public Participation for Voluntary
Approaches
The legal characterization of voluntary approaches still remains an open question,
and the resolution of that question will have important consequences for public
participation rights under the APA. For those that view mandatory regulation as the only
true type of agency “action” for addressing environmental problems, voluntary
approaches are the equivalent of inaction. Yet agencies have devoted time and resources
to these efforts and asked the public to place faith in them as responses to important
environmental issues. This section argues that in characterizing these approaches under
the APA, courts should resolve ambiguities by looking towards the agency’s public
portrayal of the voluntary program, which will often lead to a finding of agency “action.”
Similarly, when determining whether the agency’s action contains a “binding norm,”
courts should look to the political binding effects of the agency’s action as well as the
private effects. These resolutions are logical adaptations of the current doctrine to the
unique characteristics of voluntary approaches, will allow appropriate public participation
in important policy choices, and will alleviate accountability concerns by ensuing that
agencies take consistent positions in public and in court.
A. The Importance of Public Participation for Voluntary Approaches

The issue of how voluntary approaches should be characterized for purposes of
the public participation rights provided by the APAcarries important consequences .
Rulemakings serve to legitimate decisions by unaccountable agencies through a
replication of the legislative process in which all affected constituencies have the
opportunity to express their views.131 Accountability concerns are thus raised when
important environmental policy decisions are not subject to notice-and-comment
requirements. The diverse perspectives and careful deliberation that result from
rulemakings also serve to increase the quality of agency decisions, and bypassing this
process on important issues may result in agency decisions that are one-sided or not
adequately considered. Substantive judicial review of agency decisions also is an
important means of public participation. Through judicial review, members of the public
may enlist the courts to ensure that agencies do not act in ways that are arbitrary, abusive
of their discretion, or contrary to law.132
The DOE’s rulemaking to amend guidelines for the voluntary reporting of
greenhouse gases provides a real-world example of the potential value of public
participation for voluntary approaches. As of March 2004, over one hundred parties had
responded to the DOE’s request for comments, encompassing a wide range of entities
such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the World Resources Institute, the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, General Motors, the American Petroleum Institute, and
the Business Council for Sustainable Energy.133 The comments submitted also include a
diverse range of views and topics, from rejection of a voluntary approach for addressing
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climate change altogether to many narrower suggestions for making the reporting scheme
more workable.134 The DOE rulemaking brings to light the range of purposes that
rulemakings for voluntary approaches may serve, such as the opportunity for parties to
express the view that a mandatory approach is preferable, broad representation in the
setting of goals for the initiative, and the sharing of knowledge on how to increase the
effectiveness of the program.
Concerns associated with a lack of public participation for voluntary approaches
arise with respect to individual policy choices and more broadly, to the potential void in
public participation that may result from a large-scale shift to voluntary approaches. Not
every government action to encourage voluntary environmental effortsraises policy
concerns, and in fact most actions will not. To the extent that agencies may be useful in
facilitating beyond-compliance behavior, this is obviously a positive environmental good
and should be encouraged rather than burdened through expensive, time-consuming
rulemakings and litigation. The experimental, innovative value of these programs would
indeed be substantially hindered if agencies were forced to lock in certain approaches that
could only be changed through further rulemakings, and the burden of rulemaking
requirements would seem disproportionate to the value of most of the relatively smallscale projects, deterring agencies from initiating such efforts in the first place. The most
significant policy concern instead arises when agencies utilize voluntary approaches as
comprehensive responses to environmental problems to the exclusion of mandatory
approaches, even where there is legal authority to exercise regulatory control, and this
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decision to favor a voluntary over a mandatory approach is not subject to notice-andcomment or judicial review. The use of voluntary approaches may then serve to shield
controversial environmental issues from public scrutiny; the Administration will be able
to claim that it is taking action on issues through voluntary approaches, but the spotlight
on particular agency actions that normally ensues from rulemakings will be avoided and
judicial review will not be possible.
If the reverse were occurring, that is, if agencies were considering mandatory
regulations, parties would almost always have the opportunity through rulemakings to
offer their view that the agency should utilize a voluntary approach instead. In fact, there
is one circumstance in which consideration of non-regulatory approaches as possible
alternatives to mandatory regulation actually is required. Executive Order 12,866, more
generally known as President Clinton’s reform of the regulatory process, directs agencies
to “identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing
economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.”135 In
other words, the Order generally requires agencies to consider non-regulatory alternatives
when developing convention regulation. But no corresponding legal obligation exists for
the development of non-regulatory approaches, which agencies may implement without
ever considering whether “direct regulation” would better address the issue of concern.
A stark asymmetry thus exists in which the law implicitly favors non-regulatory
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approaches: comparison of mandatory and voluntary approaches is required before
agencies can promulgate mandatory regulations, but not only is such a comparison not
required before the implementation of voluntary approaches, the public has no right to
even bring such an issue to the attention of the agency through a rulemaking.136
An absence of public participation in decisions establishing voluntary approaches
will generally benefit targets of regulation and disadvantage beneficiaries of regulation.
The optimal outcome for regulated parties will usually be an agency decision in favor of
voluntary standards. That is the outcome that would automatically occur if no
rulemaking takes place, so environmental advocates in favor of mandatory regulations
would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by arguing their position in a
rulemaking or in court. Without allowing public participation in decisions to enact
voluntary policies, the regulated parties in a sense have it both ways – when there is a
possibility of mandatory requirements being imposed, they will generally be assured of a
rulemaking because a “binding norm” will be created, but when the agency is inclined to
use voluntary approaches instead, the public has no right to challenge that choice.
Concerns would also be raised if decisions made in the course of implementing
the policy are excluded from public participation. One important decision, for example,
would be the goals in pollution reduction or other measures of environmental benefits
that the program seeks to attain. Such goals, although non-binding, are important both
because they affect the level of action that the agency will encourage program
participants to take and because the success of the program will be measured against
these goals. For example, President Bush’s climate policy set a goal of reducing the
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“greenhouse intensity” of the United States economy by eighteen percent over the next
ten years, a goal that environmental advocates have vehemently protested as misleading
and inadequate.137 It may seem as though participation in setting such standards is
insignificant, since there is no real legal force behind them, but when voluntary
approaches are substituted for mandatory approaches based on the assumption that they
will be just as effective, then it must also be accepted that the goals set by these program
are just as important as the standards set in mandatory regulations.
Even more fundamentally, the largest concerns arise when looking beyond
isolated decisions by agencies to pursue voluntary approaches to the much broader
picture of what may happen in light of the overall trend in environmental policy towards
use of voluntary approaches. Such a shift has the potential to create a huge deficit in
public participation. Since the cooperation of the parties with the potential to inflict
environmental damage is necessary to the success of voluntary approaches, the real losers
from the lack of rulemaking requirements would be the public interest advocates. The
agency will out of necessity be in constant contact with the private entities to sustain their
participation in voluntary efforts. The cooperation of the private entities is essential to
the success of voluntary programs, while involvement from public interest
representatives is not. Over time, without legal requirements that the agency consider
views of public interest representatives, a two-dimensional relationship between the
agency and private interests is likely to emerge in which public interest representatives
are shut out, raising heightened agency capture concerns. The quality of environmental
policy decisions will also suffer from the lack of a diverse range of views presented to
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agencies. Most important, the rulemaking process will not serve its important function of
legitimizing the decisions of unaccountable agencies through democratic dialogue, courts
will not be able to check agency discretion, and major constituencies will have a role in
environmental policy decisions only when agencies decide to allow their participation.
B. Proposed Principle of Interpretation
Rather than leaving a large vacuum in public participation rights as the voluntary
approach paradigm continues to gain ground, the law must respond to the open question
of how voluntary approaches should be characterized for purposes of the APA. The
greatest threat to accountability would occur if voluntary approaches are characterized as
“inaction” for purposes of public participation under the APA, even while the
Administration contradicts this position by maintaining that it is taking genuine action to
address environmental problems through voluntary approaches. The Administration and
agency officials have often promoted voluntary approaches as genuine, substantive
answers to pressing environmental concerns such as climate change and habitat
conservation. It would be hypocritical for proponents of these programs to suggest that
they are equivalent to complete inaction. Agencies should therefore not have the option
of taking a contradictory position thatallows them to receive the political benefits of
publicly proclaiming solutions to environmental problems yet avoid the public scrutiny of
their policy choices that would come from rulemakings. Therefore, when agencies
publicly portray voluntary approaches as “action” the government is taking in response to
environmental problems, the voluntary approach should be also considered as action for
purposes of the APA.

Looking towards the agency’s portrayal of the voluntary approach will provide
guidance in determining whether the agency decision in question is a policy statement
and thus exempt from rulemaking requirements. As discussed previously, although the
lack of a “binding norm” is the essential characteristic of a policy statement, the question
cannot even be asked unless there is some action to which the agency could potentially
bind itself. If according to the agency’s portrayal there was no action, then the analysis
will end there with the conclusion that the decision is a policy statement exempt from
rulemaking requirements. If there is found to be action, however, the analysis may
proceed to the question of whether the action establishes a binding norm on the agency.
In the doctrine surrounding the policy statement exception, courts have given
weight to whether the agency expressed an intention to create a binding norm, but have
also been willing to look beyond the agency’s intent to any practical binding effects of
the agency statement.138 By not subjecting its decision to notice-and-comment, it may be
inferred that the agency did not intend to create a binding norm, but in this context also
the court should also look beyond the agency’s subjective intent. The analysis of whether
there has been a practical binding effect should acknowledge that the decision to pursue a
voluntary approach may have an important binding effect on the agency – a political
effect. When courts consider whether the agency has bound itself, it is typically
considering this issue with respect to the agency’s legal control over private parties. For
example, if the agency established a policy for under which circumstances it would
enforce a legal requirement, a private party that was the target of enforcement in
circumstances other than what was indicated in the policy might argue that the agency is
bound to its policy. Participants in rulemakings, however, are of much broader
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composition than only the members of the public directly affected by the regulation. The
effect of a binding normacts as a legal hook which triggers a rulemaking requirement
that allows all interested parties to participate in the formulation of the policy. Important
policy choices made by agencies affect more than the would-be targets of regulation.
This is why both the targets of regulation and the beneficiaries of regulation, such as
environmental public interest advocates, regularly participate in rulemakings, and
rulemakings are rightly open to all “interested persons.”139 The APA protects the right of
participation by more than those who are directly bound by the proposed regulation, yet
since most agency decisions do affect private rights, this tension does not usually arise.
Voluntary approaches bring this tension to the forefront – individual rights will often not
be legally affected by voluntary approaches, yet the interest in public participation is still
present.
There sometimes will in fact be practical binding effects on agencies with respect
to private parties when the agency administers incentives, but when these types of effects
are not significant enough, the doctrine should broaden to recognize that other practical
binding effects are created in a political sense. For example, a decision to establish a
voluntary approach is also a decision that private parties will not be bound. This can be
just as significant a decision for parties fearful of regulation as a decision to regulate.
While in theory an agency could still decide to regulate parties soon after the
establishment of a voluntary policy, the practical effect often is to send a political signal
that the Administration has decided not to regulate. For example, by announcing his
climate change policy publicly and as a comprehensive set of initiatives, President Bush
gave the impression that the Administration had made a definitive choice regarding its
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policy for addressing climate change and would not be revisiting the issue any time soon.
The agency also often binds itself politically in other ways through the announcement of
voluntary approaches by acknowledging that there is an environmental issue of concern,
expressing its decision that a voluntary approach is the appropriate way to respond, and
committing itself to taking certain actions towards facilitating voluntary efforts. The
same policy issues that bring environmental advocate to rulemakings are implicated from
this type of agency binding as when the agency binds itself with respect to private parties .
Sometimes, however, the agency will not have bound itself through the establishment of
a voluntary approach, because it will be clear that the program is being usedmerely as a
temporary or experimental approach, with the possibility that it may at any time be
superseded by a different approach. In such cases, when voluntary programs are merely
used as stepping stones for gathering information or developing policy, the agency will
not have politically bound itself to any particular approach, and it is justifiable to treat the
decision as a policy statement.
In the judicial review context, the characterization of the decision related to a
voluntary approach as action or inaction will largely depend upon how the plaintiff
chooses to frame the issue. If the injury claimed is the failure of the agency to carry out
an action such as issuing mandatory regulations or holding a rulemaking, then the issue is
properly treated as review of inaction under Section 706(1).140 If instead, the party is
challenging an “action” actually carried out in the course of implementing the approach,
such as the decision to grant a benefit or the choice of approach itself, then review should
take place under the broader Section 706(2) standard.141 There are, however, some
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caveats that should be observed related to the agency’s portrayal of the approach in
judicial review cases. If a party challenges the agency decision as action, and the agency
has itself publicly portrayed the approach as action as described above, then the agency
should not be able to claim as a defense in court that the approach is the equivalent of
inaction. Another special circumstance also would arise if a party challenges the inaction
of the agency’s refusal to undertake a rulemaking. When agencies have portrayed action
to the public, then the decision not to hold a rulemaking should not be analyzed as
inaction but as a “rule” already created, with the court’s analysis instead focusing on
whether that rule was subject to rulemaking requirements. Although review of agency
decisions not to hold rulemakings is generally highly deferential, such deference would
be misplaced when the court’s assumption that it is reviewing agency inaction rather than
action when that assumption is contradicted by the agency’s publicportrayal of the
approach.
Broader awareness of the public participation concerns associated with voluntary
approaches also is necessary. Agencies have a role to play. They may mitigate the
public participation concern by making efforts to use genuinely inclusive public
participation procedures when deciding to use voluntary approaches, even if rulemakings
are not used. In the broader policy debate over voluntary approaches as well, more
efforts are necessary to incorporate public participation concerns. Both critics and
advocates of voluntary approaches should expand their analysis beyond the
environmental effectiveness of these approaches to consideration of the public
participation issues they raise.

